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Abstract: Recent economic analyses emphasize that designated open-space increases the rents 
on neighboring residential land, and likewise, the probability of undeveloped land converting to 
residential uses.  This paper addresses a different question: What is the effect of local open space 
conservation on the rate of growth in the density of existing residential land? The analysis is 
relevant for exurban development and also for remote lakeshore development, where shoreline 
development density can rapidly increase over time and open-space policies are often advocated 
as a way to protect ecosystems by reducing development. A discrete choice econometric model 
of lakeshore development is estimated with a unique parcel-level spatial-temporal dataset, using 
maximum simulated likelihood to account for i) the panel structure of the data, ii) unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity, and iii) sample selection resulting from correlated unobservables.  Results 
indicate that, contrary to the intuition derived from the current literature, local open space 
conservation policies do not increase the rate of growth in residential development density, and 
some open space conservation policies may reduce the rate of growth in residential development 
density. This is consistent with land-value complementarity between local open space and parcel 
size. Spatially-explicit simulations at the landscape scale examine the relative effects of 
conservation policies on the time path of development.  
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Recent studies of land development have examined the question of how open-space 
conservation efforts such as conservation easements affect the conversion of agricultural and 
forest land to residential development (Wu and Plantinga 2003; Turner 2005; Armsworth et al. 
2006; Wu 2006).  This literature emphasizes a point that land use planners and land conservation 
organizations often overlook: By making the local landscape more attractive, local open-space 
conservation may actually increase the rate of nearby land development. The underlying 
economic logic is that open space conservation increases the value of land in residential 
development, but has little or no effect on the value of land in agriculture or forestry, and so it 
effectively increases the probability that any particular agricultural or forestry parcel is converted 
to residential. These studies are supported by a number of econometric studies of land use 
conversion, including Bockstael (1996), Irwin and Bockstael (2004), and Walsh (2007).
1      
The existing literature typically treats land conversion as a binary process: agricultural or 
forest land converts to a fixed residential development density. But residential development often 
becomes increasingly dense over time, which leads to the question addressed in this paper: What 
is the effect of open space conservation policies on the rate of change in residential density? 
Drawing on the existing economics literature on land conversion, one might reasonably conclude 
that such policies stimulate higher residential development densities.  In this paper we argue that 
this is not necessarily the case, and we apply a parcel-level econometric model to a unique 
spatial-temporal dataset to show that in at least one instance –shoreline development in northern 
Wisconsin –both open space in the form of public conservation land on shorelines, and 
  1maximum development density restrictions in the form of minimum shoreline frontage 
requirements, reduce the rate of residential subdivision.        
Cast most generally, ambiguity about the effect of open space on residential development 
density arises because the factors such as local open space that increase the value of residential 
land affect both the returns from subdividing a residential parcel and the returns from keeping 
the parcel in its original state.  Open space and other neighborhood attributes (local public goods) 
are weakly complementary with residency in the neighborhood –residency is essentially required 
for their consumption. This implies that a fixed premium attaches to every residential parcel in 
the neighborhood. It is the existence of this premium that explains why open space accelerates 
the conversion of agricultural and forest land to residential development. It also presents parcel 
owners with the opportunity to increase their welfare by creating more rather than fewer new 
parcels upon development. If the value of a parcel is separable in open space, or if parcel size 
and open space are substitutes in the land value function, then the parcel owner maximizes land 
value by subdividing to the fullest extent allowed by zoning and the natural features of the 
parcel.  On the other hand, if the decision context is the further subdivision of a parcel that is 
already in residential use, and in the land value function the size of a parcel is complementary to 
open space, then it becomes possible that an increase in local open space serves to delay 
subdivision, and that the number of parcels created upon subdivision is lower than feasible under 
relevant zoning law and the natural features of the original parcel. The explanation is that the 
incentive to capture the “open space premium” associated with each new parcel is mitigated by 
the positive effect of open space on the marginal value of parcel size.  
Understanding how open-space conservation affects the dynamics of residential 
development is important for its obvious implications for economic welfare and land use 
  2planning, and also for its implications for ecosystem change, perhaps especially in the case of 
lakeshore development (the empirical application examined in this study). The development of 
shoreline property can result in major ecosystem change across North American lakes.  In 
particular, high density shoreline development can lead to the clearing of sunken logs serving as 
habitat for a variety of aquatic species (Christensen et al. 1996), reduced growth rates of fish 
(Schindler et al. 2000), reduced abundance of amphibians and birds (Woodford and Meyer 2003; 
Lindsay et al. 2002), increased nutrient loading of lakes (Schindler 2006), and an increase in 
aquatic species invasions arising from increased recreational use of lakes (Hrabik and Magnuson 
1999).  
In this paper we analyze the effects of shoreline zoning restrictions and public 
conservation land on the amount and spatial configuration of land development across a fast-
growing lake system in the northern forest region of Wisconsin.  The econometric model is 
estimated with an extensive panel dataset developed by reconstructing historical GIS data from 
paper plat maps.  The development process of 1,575 privately-owned shoreline parcels is 
followed from 1974 through 1998 in four-year intervals, resulting in a unique spatial-temporal 
dataset on land development over a 25-year period for 140 individual lakes.          
  In addition to the unique spatial-temporal dataset, there are two distinguishing features of 
the econometric modeling that contribute to the land use literature.  The first is the joint 
estimation of subdivision density –that is, the number of parcels created per unit shoreline –with 
the binary decision of whether or not to subdivide in the first place.  Most studies analyzing the 
probability of residential development assume that development occurs at the maximum density 
allowable by zoning (Bockstael 1996; Irwin and Bockstael 2002; Carion-Flores and Irwin 
2004).
2  With our dataset this presumption that subdivision occurs at maximum density is not 
  3justified: 50% of all observed subdivisions generated a lower density than allowed by law.
3 
Given our theoretical framework, joint rather than separate estimation of these decisions is 
necessary because the two decisions embed correlated random variables.  This presents a classic 
sample selection problem: the researcher observes the number of new parcels created upon 
subdivision only when subdivision actually occurs.  The full-information maximum simulated 
likelihood approach used in this paper explicitly accounts for sample selection that arises from 
this decision problem.    
  The second distinguishing feature of the econometric modeling is the use of a random 
effects framework to account for both the panel structure of the data and potential unobserved 
spatial heterogeneity.  The development decision depends on attributes unobservable to the 
analyst.  One can expect that these unobservables are correlated over time and across parcels on 
the same lake. This implies that repeated observations of a landowner’s development decision 
are temporally correlated at the parcel level, and that development decisions across parcels are 
correlated at the lake level. We develop a random effects model to account for such temporal and 
spatial correlation that can be estimated within the full-information maximum simulated 
likelihood framework discussed above.  
  The econometric analysis investigates the effect of two open space conservation policies 
on lakeshore development. The first policy is the creation of public conservation land, and the 
second is a zoning policy specifying the minimum shoreline frontage required for a new 
shoreline parcel (this is analogous to a minimum lot size requirement). Each of these open space 
policies provides the foundation for a pair of tests of whether parcel size and open space are 
separable, substitutes, or complements in the land value function. The first test concerns the 
effect of open space on the decision to subdivide, and the second test concerns the decision about 
  4the number of new lots created upon subdivision. The overall conclusion of the analysis is that 
because open space and parcel size are apparently complements in the land value function, open 
space conservation does not increase the rate of growth in residential development density, and 
open space conservation via the creation of public conservation land may actually reduce the rate 
of growth in residential development density.      
The paper is organized as follows. A simple exposition of the landowner’s subdivision 
problem is presented in section 2 to contrast the problem examined here with the usual 
subdivision problem examined in the literature. The econometric model and estimation 
framework are presented in section 3, and the application is described in section 4.  Estimation 
results are presented in section 5, and a landscape simulation model is developed in section 6 to 
analyze the effects of zoning and publicly-owned shoreline on the spatial and temporal patterns 
of land conversion. The paper concludes in section 7 with a discussion of the implications of the 
analysis for policies designed to control land development. 
2.  Exposition of the landowner’s subdivision problem 
 
Drawing on Capozza and Helsley (1989), the recent literature on land development 
typically assumes that the rental value of undeveloped land is constant, and the value of 
developed land increases smoothly over time.  As a result the development decision is a 
deterministic optimal stopping problem in which development takes place at time t when,
4
  ( ) ( ) ,
DU D R wt R z = , (1) 
 
where  ( ) ,
D R wt  is the rental value of developed land,  ( )
UD R z  is the rental value of undeveloped 
land, w is a vector of variables affecting the value of developed land, and z is a vector of 
variables affecting the value of undeveloped land. Although the econometric decision model we 
develop below is more general than this –in particular, the decision problem is stochastic and the 
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the outcome of a maximization problem (how many parcels to create upon subdivision) –it is 
instructive to briefly compare such an optimal stopping problem with its counterpart applicable 
in the context of our analysis.  
  The standard assumption is that the rental value in the undeveloped state is not a function 
of the same set of variables as the rental value in the developed state ( ) wz ≠ , because the 
undeveloped state is typically forestry or agriculture. The implication of this is that any variable 
 that increases the rental value of the developed state will decrease the time to land 
development (or, analogously in a stochastic setting, increase the probability that an 
undeveloped parcel is developed in the current period).  
j ww ∈
  In the context of our analysis, where the decision choice involves converting a residential 
parcel into two or more residential parcels, the rental value in the “undeveloped” state (un-
subdivided parcel) is a function of the same variables that affect the rental value in the developed 
state.  Formally, we designate f as the variable over which subdivision occurs; f is lake frontage 
in our econometric application, and it is parcel area in most settings. The vector of determinants 
of rental value is then expanded to  ( ) , wf x = , where x is a public good (like open space), the 
value of which therefore accrues to all parcels created upon subdivision. Assuming that 
conditional on development, the rental value of the land is maximized with just two parcels, the 
rental value in the developed state can be presented as  ( ) ( ) 12 1 2 ,, ,, R R Rfx t Rfx t += + , and the rental 
value in the undeveloped state can be presented as ( ) 12 ,, Tot R Rf fx t =+ .   
  6  Now assuming that the value of the parcel in its “dense” state of development is rising 
faster than its value in its “sparse” state of development –an assumption we maintain to keep the 
analysis parallel to the Capozza and Helsley model –the condition for subdivision is now,  
  12 Tot RR R + =   .  (2) 
 
In the context of our problem it is no longer obvious that an increase in the public good will 
reduce the time to development. Differentiation of  (2) with respect to x and t generates the 
result,  
 
12 12 Tot Tot RR RR RR
dx dt
xx x t tt
∂∂ ⎡∂ ∂ ⎤ ⎡ ∂ ∂ ⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ +− = −+ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦
  .  (3) 
 
Staying with the Capozza and Helsely (1989) assumption that rents from the developed state are 
rising faster than rents from the undeveloped state, the bracketed term on the right hand side of 
(3) is negative. For the case where R is separable in x –the case where the public good fetches a 
simple premium for any parcel in the neighborhood –the bracketed term on the left-hand side of 
(3) is positive, and an increase in x must decrease the time to development (increase the 









), it becomes possible that the bracketed term on the left-hand side of (3) is 
actually negative, in which case an increase in x will increase the time to development (reduce 
the probability of development), because an increase in x increases the marginal value of 
frontage more on a larger lot.  
The important insight from this simple analysis is that because a local public good like 
open space may be complementary to parcel size, an increase in the public good, though it 
increases the value of residential land, does not necessarily induce an increase in the likelihood 
that a parcel already in residential use is further subdivided.  Analogous reasoning makes clear 
  7that an increase in the local public good also may not induce an increase in the number of parcels 
created upon subdivision; more public-good premiums are generated by creating more (and 
smaller) parcels, but possibly the value of each premium declines as more parcels are created.  
 
3. Econometric model of the landowner’s subdivision decision 
We cast a lake shoreline owner’s decision problem as a matter of deciding how many 
parcels to create at time t. We do not formally model the dynamics of this decision problem, 
instead casting the decision problem in terms of the (reduced form) net value of creating mt new 
parcels at time t, mt =1,2,…, with the dynamics of the decision problem implicitly embedded in 
the land value function via the presence of important state variables, such as shoreline 
development density, as arguments of the land value function.  
Parcel n on lake l is subdivided at time t if the net land value of subdivision is positive. 
Formally, we denote this land value by, 
  ( ) nt l Uw μ + , (4) 
where  is a set of parcel characteristics (including characteristics of the lake on which the 
parcel sits, such as size of the lake), and 
nt w
l μ  denotes a lake-specific characteristic observed by the 
parcel owner but not by the analyst.  We model  l μ  as an iid normal random variable distributed 
with mean zero and standard deviation  1 σ .  
The land value function in (4) is itself an indirect function derived from the decision  
about how many new parcels to create, given subdivision occurs. Formally, the value of creating 
m new parcels from parcel n at time t is given by, 
  ( ) mn t l m n Vw t μ ϕ ++ , (5) 
  8where  mnt ϕ is a decision-specific variable observed by the parcel owner at the time the decision is 
made, but a random variable from the perspective of the analyst. Given the decision to subdivide, 
the decision about the number of parcels to create is the solution to the problem, 
      () () { }
1 max
M
nt m nt mnt m Uw V w ϕ
= =+  ,             (6) 
 where the land value function U is a random variable because it is derived by maximizing over a 
set of random variables. For instance, if  mnt ϕ  has a Type I extreme value distribution with 
location parameter equal to zero and a common scale parameter ξ  for m=1,…M, then  
  () () ( )
1
,l n nt nt m nt nt M Uw V w υ γυ
ξ
⎡⎤ = −+ ⎣⎦ ∑ , (7) 
where  nt υ  is distributed Type I extreme value with location equal to zero and scale equal to ξ , 
and γ  is Euler’s constant.  This suggests a rather complicated form for U that generally must be 
derived by simulation if one chooses to specify particular forms of  ( ) mn t Vw and particular 
distributions of  mnt ϕ .  Moreover, (6) and (7) make clear that explicit derivation of U requires 
parameterization of the functions  ( ) mn t Vw, which significantly increases the size of the 
econometric problem by adding parameters that are not of first-order importance to the analysis. 
With this in mind, we instead simply assert that (6) generates a land value function adequately 
represented by a function of the form,   
  ( ) , nt nt nt nt Uw w υ δυ = + , (8) 
where  nt υ  is an iid standard normal random variable.  
The number of parcels created upon subdivision is defined by the function, 
  () ( ) { }
*
1 ,a r g m a x
M
nt n m nt mnt m m
mw Vw ωϕ
= =+   ,  (9) 
  9where the variable  n ω  is a random variable whose presence in  ( )
* m ⋅  reinforces that m
* is a 
random variable by virtue of the fact that it is generated by an operation on the set of random 
variables  mnt ϕ .  Once again taking the tack that we can adequately represent this indirect function 
by a simple specification capturing the essential elements of the decision problem, we assume 
that m
* is Poisson-distributed, that its expected value depends on  and the random variable  nt w n ω , 
and that it is necessarily correlated with the land value of subdivision  ( ) , nt nt Uwυ  by virtue of the 
fact that both U and m
* are derived from operations on the same set of random variables  mnt ϕ . In 
particular, we specify that the expected value of m





exp( )/ 1 exp( exp( )
exp( )/ 1 exp( exp( )
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θ ση θ ση
=+ − −+
=+− −+
,     (10) 
where  n ω  is a normal random variable with standard deviation  2 σ , and so it follows that  n η is a 
standard normal random variable. To account for the correlation of U and  , we assume that 
* m
nt υ  and  n η  are jointly normal:     
  { } ( ) ( ) ,0 , 0 , 1 , 1 nn t N , η υρ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦     .  (11) 
 
The probability that  , m=1,2…, given that subdivision occurs, and conditional on   and 
* mm = nt w



















⎡⎤ == ⎣⎦ −+
       (12)  
It deserves emphasis that ignoring in estimation the obvious correlation between U and m
* would 
generate inconsistent as well as inefficient estimators because of the censored nature of the data: 
we observe m
* only for those cases where subdivision takes place. The particular formulation 
used here –a probit model for the subdivision decision, and a Poisson model for the number of 
  10parcels created, with correlated errors across the models –can be estimated by applying the 
formulation used by Greene (2006) to address the sample selection issue implicit in such data.
5 
As stated by Greene, if the random element of the binary selection model (decision to subdivide) 
is uncorrelated with the random element of the count model (number of parcels to create), there 
is no issue of selection bias. But as shown above, in our particular analysis such correlation is 
true by the construction of the underlying decision problem, and so it is essential to explicitly 
model the correlation in the unobservables of the models.   
3.1.  Estimation of the decision parameters 
The decision model involves a number of parameters to be estimated from the data: 
12 ,, , , δ θσ σ  and ρ .  The data used in the analysis includes observations on the decision to 
subdivide,  , where   if the net value of subdivision defined in  nt y 1 nt y = (8) is positive; property 
characteristics  ; and, given that subdivision takes place, the number of parcels created,  .  
Our estimation approach extends the selection framework developed by Greene (2006) to include 




( ) Φ⋅ denote the standard normal cumulative distribution 
function, the probability of subdivision conditional on   and  nt w l μ  is given by 
  () ( ) Pr 1| , nt nt l nt l yw w μ δμ == Φ + , (13) 
 and so given the properties of a joint normal distribution, the probability of subdivision 
conditional on  ,  nt w l μ , and  n η  is given by 
  () [] ( )
2 Pr 1| , , 1 nt nt l n nt l n yw w μ ηδ μ ρ η == Φ + + ρ −  .  (14) 
Conditional on  n η  and  l μ , the decision to subdivide and the number of parcels created upon 
subdivision are statistically independent, and so the probability of observing a subdivision that 
  11creates m  parcels is simply the product of  (12) and (14).  Conditioning this probability on only 
the observed variables   requires integrating out  nt w n η  and  l μ : 
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⎡⎤ + ⎡⎤ =⋅ Φ + + − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ −+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫
,(15) 
where  () φ η  and  () φ μ  are the density functions for η and μ . The probability of the observed 
behavior on parcel n at time t is generally stated, 
















( ) ( ) yy y wd
mw
θσ η θσ η
d δ μρ η ρφ η φ μη μ
θσ η
−+ ⎡⎤ + ⎡⎤ =− + ⋅ ⋅ Φ− ⋅+ + − ⎢⎥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ −+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫
,  (16) 
where the term   in the density function of the standard normal is an expositional and 
computational convenience that exploits the symmetry of the normal distribution.  
2 nt y −1
At this juncture it is important to emphasize that observations of the subdivision decision 
are not statistically independent because we have included two random variables that capture 
unobservable effects that persist across observations. In particular,  n η  captures parcel-level 
unobservables that persist over time, and  l μ  captures lake-level unobservables that persist over 
time and across all parcels on the same lake. Inclusion of these variables compels simulation of 
the likelihood function because direct calculation would involve multi-dimensional integration 
(1+ the number of parcels on lake l) over an inevitably tiny probability space.  
We denote by Nl the set of sample properties on lake l, and we denote by Dl  the full set of 
subdivision decisions   made by members of   over all time periods.  Conditional on η (,) my l N n 
and μl, the probability of the observed subdivision decision on parcel n at time t is simply the 
integrand of (16), and so, conditional on ηn and μl , the probability of Dl is, 
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⎡⎤ + ⎡ ⎤ =− + ⋅ ⋅ Φ − ⋅ + + ⎢⎥ − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ −+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
∏∏ . (17) 
The likelihood of the observed subdivision behavior on lake l can be simulated by drawing 
randomly from the independent normal distributions of η and μ . Taking R  sets of draws, with 
each set comprised of a single draw from the distribution of μ  and   draws from the 
distribution of 
l N
η, generates an approximation of the likelihood function, 






=  .  (18) 
The full simulated log likelihood function is then  , where there are L lakes in 









{ } 12 ,, , , δ θσ σ ρ , though as discussed below, in our application this parameter set is slightly 
altered in an attempt to correct for possible endogeneity bias specific to our data. 
4.  Application of the model 
The econometric model is applied to lakeshore property in Vilas County, Wisconsin, a 
popular vacation destination that has more seasonal than permanent residences.  The county has 
one of the highest concentrations of freshwater lakes in the world, and land development in the 
county is heavily focused on lake shorelines (Schnaiberg et al. 2002).   This study area was 
chosen because prior work in the region has documented the amenity effects of open-space 
conservation policies.  An analysis of county-level migration rates across the northern forest 
region – including our study area – found that in-migration rates are higher in counties with more 
public conservation land (Lewis et al. 2002).  A hedonic analysis found that per-foot shoreline 
property values are higher on lakes with more public land and for which the future development 
prevented by stricter zoning is relatively high (Spalatro and Provencher 2001).   This provides 
  13the backdrop to examine whether local public goods that raise the price of land also increase land 
development.   
4.1  Data sources and database construction  
 In our econometric analysis the unit of observation is the parcel, and the sample consists 
of only legally subdividable lakeshore parcels in Vilas County.  The data were derived from a 
number of sources, including the GIS database described below, the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources (WI DNR), USDA soil surveys, and town governments in Vilas County.   
Estimating land conversion models requires spatial data for multiple points in time, yet 
2003 is the only year for which digitized tax parcel information is available for Vilas County.  
We therefore developed a method to digitize historical plat maps
6 for Vilas County that 
backcasts from the 2003 GIS dataset.  The resulting dataset enables the consistent tracking of 
development for all parcels between 1974 and 2003.   Hard copy versions of historical plat maps 
are available for Vilas County in four year intervals from 1974-1998.  The method for digitizing 
the plat maps involves four steps.  First, a digital image of the plat maps is obtained from a high 
resolution scanner.
7  Second, geographic coordinates are assigned to the maps by using a process 
known as rectifying, whereby coordinates from the 2003 GIS dataset are assigned to control 
points on the newly-generated digital image of the plat map. After a number of control points are 
set, the map is assigned the coordinates of the 2003 GIS dataset.  In this way, the scanned plat 
map is now an image file with a distinct spatial location.   
The third step is to assign attributes to the parcels of the newly-rectified digital plat maps 
by working backwards from the 2003 GIS dataset.  This process begins by overlaying the 2003 
GIS layer with the rectified digital plat map such that parcel boundaries in the rectified plat map 
are matched to their counterparts in the 2003 GIS layer.  Subdivisions are identified where the 
  14parcel lines on the 2003 GIS layer do not coincide with any parcel boundary on the rectified plat 
maps.  The last step is to generate a modified copy of the 2003 GIS layer so that it matches the 
rectified plat map, in effect creating a historical GIS layer corresponding to the year of the plat 
map.  When the lines that delineate a parcel appear in the GIS file but not the digitized plat map 
of a particular year, the multiple small parcels in the 2003 GIS layer are merged together to 
represent the pre-subdivision parcel.  This process is repeated for each historical year that plat 
maps are available.  In the end, each time period—1974 through 1998 in 4 year intervals—has a 
GIS file with all of the spatial attributes of the parcels.   
  The database of shoreline development consists of all subdividable parcels on 140 lakes 
in Vilas County.
8 In 1974, there were 1,310 parcels that could be legally subdivided, and 335 
individual subdivisions occured between 1974 and 1998.  Approximately 11% of parcels were 
subdivided more than once. If, after an observed subdivision, a newly created parcel was itself 
legally subdividable, it was added to the database. Consequently the dataset used in estimation 
has 1,575 subdividable parcels of land, some of which were not in existence at the start of the 
study period.  
The lakeshore development process in Vilas County is dominated by relatively small 
developments by many individual landowners, as indicated by the fact that during the study 
period 82% of recorded subdivisions generated less than six new parcels each.  Parcels of more 
than 1,500 feet of frontage account for only 25% of the recorded subdivisions in the dataset, but 
generated approximately 49% of all new parcels.   
4.2. Open space variables 
  To examine the role of open-space conservation on shoreline development, we include 
the following three variables in the analysis:  the proportion of a lake shoreline in public 
  15conservation land (Public), the average frontage of private parcels on the lake (AvFront), which 
is a measure of current development sparcity (the inverse of development density), and the state 
of zoning on the lake (Zoning). Among these the role of Zoning in the analysis requires some 
explanation.  
Throughout the discussion we have alluded to the potential for zoning to preserve open 
space via limits it establishes on the density of development. For instance, zoning often requires 
minimum lot sizes. In our application this limit is manifest in a minimum frontage requirement 
for shoreline properties. During the study period the default minimum was the statewide 
minimum of 100 feet. Towns were free to exceed the state’s requirements, and by the end of the 
study period 7 of the 14 towns in Vilas County set the minimum shoreline frontage requirement 
at 200 feet.
9  Zoning is a binary variable that takes a value of 0 if the applicable minimum 
frontage requirement is 100 feet, and a value of 1 if the requirement is 200 feet.  
The effect of zoning on the subdivision decision can be divided into a direct effect and an 
indirect effect. Concerning the former, zoning directly constrains the number of parcels that can 
be created upon subdivision. This direct effect depends on the amount of parcel frontage, and so 
in our econometric model Zoning is interacted with a parcel’s amount of frontage (Front).  The 
indirect effect of zoning arises via its effect on the amount of open space preserved on a lake.  
This effect depends on the level of development at the time the subdivision decision is made; 
stricter zoning on a lake that is already fully developed under the state minimum frontage 
requirement of 100 feet will have a much lower conservation effect than on a lake that is 
relatively undeveloped. Because it impacts the supply of a local public good, this conservation 
effect may affect both the binary decision to subdivide and the decision about the number of 
parcels to create upon subdivision. We capture this conservation effect via the interaction 
  16AvFront Zoning ⋅ .  The greater the value of AvFront, the greater the effect of Zoning on the 
conservation of open space. 
As discussed earlier, the basic logic that open space may reduce the probability of 
subdivision relies on the complementarity of open space and parcel size. To provide the 
flexibility necessary to test for such complementarity, in our econometric model we include 
interactions between our open space variables Public, AvFront, and  AvFront Zoning ⋅ , and the 
parcel’s frontage (Frontage), which is the relevant measure of a parcel’s size.  
4.3. Potential endogeneity of open space variables 
An important issue in a study of household responses to open space variables is the 
potential endogeneity of the variables.  In our analysis, Public and Zoning are reasonably 
modeled as exogenous variables. Almost all public conservation land in the county was acquired 
in the early 20
th century.
10  Widespread logging in the late 1800s – commonly referred to as “the 
cutover” – cleared most of the original forestland in northern Wisconsin and set the stage for 
mostly failed attempts to farm newly harvested –and agriculturally marginal –land.  Most of the 
present day tracts of public land in Vilas County were either purchased or forfeited to public 
control in response to widespread land abandonment in the 1930’s-1950’s (Flader 1983). 
The case for the exogeneity of Zoning is equally compelling, because shoreline zoning 
takes place at the town level, and there are scores of lakes in each town.  In addition, contrary to 
a common lament that zoning ordinances are often ineffective because variances are easy to get –
a lament indicating that zoning is to some degree endogenous –lakeshore zoning is apparently 
enforced in Vilas County: we found that only 5% of the recorded shoreline subdivisions clearly 
violated the zoning standards at the time of subdivision.
11  
  17On the other hand, AvFront is best modeled as endogenous because it is a function of past 
subdivision decisions; the same unobservable lake characteristics that led to the current average 
size of private parcels on the lake may also affect a parcel owner’s current subdivision 
decision.
12  Formally, the endogeneity of AvFront arises because our inclusion in the model of 
the lake-specific random effect (μl) introduces a time-invariant spatially-correlated 
unobservable.
13  The specific econometric challenge is that discrete-choice random effects 
estimation generates inconsistent estimators if the random effect is correlated with a regressor 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2006).    
We devise two strategies for handling the potential endogeneity of the average frontage 
of private parcels.  First, following prior work on correlated random effects models (e.g. 
Mundlak 1978; Zabel 1992), we build correlation into the model by specifying the lake-specific 
effect as a function of each lake’s initial average frontage in 1974:  ,74 ll AvFront l μ λξ = + , where 
2
1 ~( 0 , ) l N ξ σ .
14  The intuition for this specification is that the initial state of development on 
each lake in 1974 proxies for the unobserved attractiveness of each lake for development.   
Results from this specification are presented in the next section as model 1; the set of parameters 
to be estimated is amended to include λ .    
The second strategy takes the perspective that we are less interested in the effect on the 
subdivision decision of AvFront per se, but rather in the way the current amount of open space 
on the lake, as indexed by AvFront, modifies the effect of the policy variable Zoning.  From this 
perspective a way to deal with the endogeneity of AvFront is to simply drop AvFront from the 
model and to specify the effect of zoning on the subdivision decision as a random effect taking 
the form  12
11 2 () ( lt l lt n l Zoning Zoning Front
β
2 )
β β σϖ β σϖ ++ ⋅ + in the Probit model, and 
  1834
33 44 () () lt l lt n l Zoning Zoning Front
ββ β σϖ β σϖ ++ ⋅ + in the Poisson model, where 
1
l ϖ  and 
2
l ϖ  
are lake-specific standard nor al random variables correlated with one another and, import
with the lake-specific effect  l
m ,  antly
μ , and 
3
l ϖ  and 
4
l ϖ  are independent standard normal random 
variables.
15 This random parameters framework accounts for the fact that the effect of zoning on 
the subdivision decision varies from lake to lake and may depend on unobservable features of the 
lake, but as opposed to model 1, where the effect is explicitly tied to a lake’s development 
(as measured by the average frontage of private parcels), it treats the effect of zoning as 
random variable possibly correlated with unobserved features of the lake. This random 
level 
a 
ing section as model 2.  
4.4. Other variables used in estimation 
on 






parameters specification is presented in the follow
Table 1 defines the variables used in estimation and provides summary statistics. 
Following the conceptual model in section 3, the same variables, including the same interacti
terms, are used to predict both the probability
 upon subdivision.  
A parcel’s frontage (Front) is included in the model both in interaction terms for reas
described above, and in a quadratic form.  We include two variables depicting soil-related 
impediments to development: the percent of the parcel that has soil limitations for development 
(PSL), and the percent of the parcel with soil not rated for development (PSNR) –an indication of 
the presence of a wetland.  We include the dummy variable SPLIT in the belief that although the
location of an existing residential structure may negatively affect the potential to subdivide any 
y, this is especially true of smaller parcels that can be legally split only into two parcels.   
Previous hedonic analyses of lakefront property (Spalatro and Provencher 2001; Boyle et
al. 1999) have shown that a number of lake characteristics influence shoreline property values.  
  19To account for the effect of such lake characteristics on the subdivision decision we include in 
the analysis variables concerning water clarity, lake size, lake depth, and distance to the neares
town with major services.  Finally, to account for economy-wide fluctuations (
t 
e.g. changes in 
ude dummy variables for each four-year time interval. 
 are a 
.  
mortgage rates) we incl
5. Estimation Results 
  The joint Probit-Poisson model in (17) is estimated with original Matlab code by 
maximum simulated likelihood using independent sets of 200 Halton draws.  Halton draws
systematic method of drawing from distributions that is useful for reducing the number of 
simulations while increasing the accuracy of the estimation (Train 2003).  The estimation results 
are generally robust across model 1 and model 2. In the discussion below we focus on model 1
  In model 1 the random effects coefficient for AvFront in 1974 (λ ) is not significan
different from zero at any reasonable confidence level. Since estimating model 1 without 
AvFront in 1974 produces virtually identical estimates for all coefficients, it appears that the 
potential correlation between average parcel frontage and unobservable lake-specific effects is
not strong.  This result is reinforced by the small estimated standard error of the lake-specific 
effect relative to the estimated constant term in both models. Further, the similarities betwe







econometric problems associated with this variable do not appear to be severe.      
  The results in table 2 generally conform to expectations and yield the following basic 
conclusions. First, the probability of subdivision is increasing at a decreasing rate with frontage
size.  Second, the probability of subdivision is lower for parcels with greater soil restrictions.  
Third, the expected number of new parcels created upon subdivision is increasing at a d
rate with frontage size.  Fourth, while the parameter estimates for most parcel-specific 
  20characteristics are significantly different from zero, most of the lake-specific characteristics do




16  Fifth, there is evidence of unobserved lake and parcel heterogen
that influences shoreline development decisions, as indicated by the statistically significant 
values of  1 σ  (the standard deviation of the lake effect  l μ ) and  2 σ  (the standard deviation of the 
parcel effect  n ω ). And finally, unobservables are correlated across the decision to subdivide (
probit model) and the decision about the numbe
the 






 on both the probability of subdivision and the number of parcels created upon 
subdivi
, 
in ed by the statistical significance of ρ.
17  
  Each of the two open space policies included in the econometric analysis (public 
conservation land, minimum shoreline frontage requirement) provide the foundation for a pair of 
tests of whether parcel size and open space are separable, substitutes, or complements in the land
value function. The first test concerns the effect of open space on the decision to subdivide, an
the second test concerns the decision about the number of new lots created upon subdivision. 
If parcel frontage and open space are either separable or substitutes in the land value fu
then an increase in conserved open space necessarily increases both the probability of 
subdivision (first test) and the number of parcels created upon subdivision (second test), due to 
the price premium generated by the conservation of open space.
18  On the other hand, if parcel 
frontage is a complement to open space, then an increase in protected open space may reduce 
have no effect
sion.  
In our econometric analysis this logic applies in a straightforward manner in the case of 
open space preserved by public conservation land. We calculated, for each parcel in the sample
the discrete-change effect of a 10% increase in public conservation land. The discrete-change 
  21effect accounts for all variable interactions and is the difference in the estimated probabilit











n, even when parcel size and open 
space are separable or substitutes in the land value function.   
19  The statistical significance of 
discrete-change effects is calculated by implementation of the Delta Method (Greene 2000).  A
shown in Figure 1a, we find that the increase in public conservation land has no effect on the 
probability that small parcels are subdivided, and reduces the probability that large parcels are 
subdivided (first test). We also find that the increase in public conservation land has no effect
the number of parcels created upon subdivision (second test; results not shown in Figure 1). 
These results suggest that parcel size and the o
plements in the land value function.   
Figures 1b and 1c evaluate the sample discrete change effects of an increase in th
minimum frontage requirement from 100 feet (the statewide minimum) to 200 feet (the 
minimum that applies to many observations in the data set). We find that an increase in zoning 
strictness generally has no statistically significant effect on the probability of subdivision, and
statistically significant negative effect on the number of parcels created upon subdivision for 
most parcels. Yet this discrete-change effect is not a good measure of the open-space effect of 
minimum frontage zoning, because, as mentioned in the previous section, such zoning has two 
effects on the subdivision decision: the indirect effect of open space conservation, and the dire
effect of constraining parcel subdivision; a higher minimum frontage requirement necessar
reduces the number of new parcels that can be created, which in turn reduces the value of 
subdivision and thus the probability that a parcel in our sample is subdivided.  It follows t
increase in zoning strictness may generate an overall reduction in both the probability of 
subdivision and the number of parcels created upon subdivisio
  22To evaluate the (indirect) open-space effect of zoning, we compare the discrete change 
effect of zoning on lakes that are relatively developed to those that are relatively pristine. In 
particular, we compared the effect of an increase in the minimum frontage requirement from 100 
feet to 200 feet for a parcel with sample average characteristics for all variables except frontage, 
on a lake with average development density (AvFront=400 feet), and a lake with low 
development density (AvFront=1000 feet). We found that for all parcel sizes examined, the 
effect of the zoning change on the probability of subdivision was no different for average and 
low density lakes (first test), and that the effect of the zoning change on the number of parcels 
created upon subdivision also was no different for average and low density lakes (second test).
20  
These results suggest that once again parcel size and open space are complements in the land 
value function.
      
6. Landscape and Policy Simulations 
  While both zoning and public conservation ownership can be used to physically constrain 
a lake’s development to the same long-run level, the approach to the long-run level may be quite 
different under zoning than under public conservation ownership. To examine the time path 
under the two conservation strategies, we apply the econometric model in a spatially-explicit 
landscape simulation model.  Following Lewis and Plantinga (2007), we interpret the fitted 
subdivision probabilities denoted by (13) as a set of rules that govern land-use change.  For 
example, if the subdivision probability is 0.1 for a particular parcel, the owner of the parcel will 
subdivide 10% of the time if the choice situation is repeated.  A random number generator is 
used to repeatedly draw from a uniform distribution defined on the unit interval and compared 
with the estimated subdivision probability.  If the draw is less than or equal to the estimated 
subdivision probability for that parcel, the parcel is assumed to subdivide; otherwise the parcel is 
  23assumed to remain in its current state.  If a parcel subdivides in any given simulation run, the 
number of new parcels is assumed to be the estimated expectation of new parcels as defined by 
the Poisson model.
21  Conducting this simulation for every parcel on a lake at each point in time 
over a long horizon gives a particular development path for the lake.  Importantly, the 
simulation embeds the dynamic result that subdivisions in one period affect all future subdivision 
decisions on all parcels on the lake via the change in the variable AvFront.  Simulating the 
development path many times and taking the average across the simulations gives the average 
development path for the lake. 
  We evaluate the relative effects of zoning compared to public conservation land by using 
the landscape simulation model to examine the development path of a hypothetical lake with 
characteristics that match the average lake in our sample.  In particular, we examine the 
development path under the following policies: i) a baseline policy where zoning sets the 
minimum frontage of a parcel at 100 feet and there is no publicly-owned shoreline, ii) a 
conservation policy where the minimum frontage requirement is increased to 200 feet and there 
is no publicly-owned shoreline (“zoning policy”), and iii) a conservation policy where the 
minimum frontage requirement remains at 100 feet and 50% of the shoreline is public 
conservation land (“public ownership policy”).  The two conservation policies generate physical 
restrictions to achieve the same long-run effect: one-half of the shoreline development of the 
baseline policy.      
  Figure 2 plots four scenarios for the 200-year development path of a lake with 100,000 
feet of shoreline, where each time path represents the average of 100 simulated time paths.  In 
three of the scenarios, the 100,000 feet of frontage is initially divided evenly among 20 parcels, 
generating a parcel size of 5,000 feet for the baseline and zoning policies, and a parcel size of 
  242,500 feet for the public ownership policy. To evaluate the effect of the disparity in initial parcel 
size, we added a fourth scenario in which the public ownership policy is evaluated from an initial 
position of 10 private parcels of 5,000 feet per parcel. As can be seen in Figure 2, the initial 
parcel size has relatively little effect on the development path under the public ownership policy.   
  In the baseline scenario, development grows at an increasing rate for the first 32 years 
before growing at an increasingly decreasing rate for the remainder of the time horizon.  The 
concavity in growth rates after t=30 appears to be driven primarily by the lower frontage size for 
the remaining un-subdivided parcels.  While the physical restrictions of the two conservation 
policies (public ownership and zoning) imply a long-run development level equivalent to one-
half the baseline, the spillovers associated with these policies result in a lower initial growth rate 
of development than the baseline.  In particular, the public ownership policy generates 
significantly lower growth in early years than either the baseline or zoning policies. This result is 
driven primarily by the significantly lower probability of subdivision of large parcels on lakes 
with relatively high proportions of public conservation land.  While the initial growth rate on the 
lake with the zoning policy is similar to the baseline growth rate, the negative effect of zoning on 
the density of development keeps the growth rate of development below the baseline in all 
periods. 
7. Discussion 
  In this paper we examine the effects of minimum frontage zoning requirements and 
public conservation land on the decisions of private landowners to subdivide and develop 
lakeshore property.  Our analysis provides a number of contributions to the land use literature.  
First, we empirically model the decision to subdivide and develop large residential parcels and 
show how this decision problem conceptually differs from the decision to develop an agricultural 
  25parcel.  Second, we model the joint decision of whether to subdivide a parcel, and how many 
parcels to create upon subdivision, in a full information likelihood framework that explicitly 
accounts for sample selection.  Third, we develop a random effects framework that accounts for 
both the panel structure of the data and potentially unobserved spatial heterogeneity.  Fourth, we 
provide econometric tests of the relationship between protected open space and parcel size. 
  The primary message of this paper concerns the effects of local open space conservation 
policies on the development of private land.  While past analyses have made a compelling case 
that local open space conservation can increase the development of private land by increasing the 
returns from development relative to agriculture (e.g. Wu and Plantinga 2003), we find evidence 
that public conservation land on lake shorelines can actually reduce the probability that 
privately-owned residential parcels subdivide and develop.  When the development decision is to 
subdivide and develop a large residential parcel – rather than to develop an agricultural parcel – 
factors that increase the value of residential land, such as open-space conservation, affect both 
the returns from developing and the returns from keeping the land in its original state.  
Theoretically, the effect of open-space conservation policies on the development of existing 
residential land depends on the relationship –separable, substitutes or complements –between 
parcel size and local open space in the land value function.  Our econometric model provides 
four tests of the nature of this relationship. The results are consistent with a complementary 
relationship between parcel size and open space in all four tests, and inconsistent with a 
separable/substitute relationship in three of the four tests.  
  Recent results from a survey of lakeshore property owners in our study region shed 
additional light on this relationship.
22  On average, respondents with large parcels (>500 feet of 
frontage) reside on lakes with less private development and more public conservation land than 
  26respondents with small parcels.  Yet when asked to identify from a list of 18 possibilities the 
three things that they would most like to change about their lake, 53% of respondents with large 
parcels, and only 39% of respondents with small parcels, included the change, “reduce the 
amount of shoreline development”. Not only is this result consistent with the conclusion that 
open space and parcel size are land-value complements, but it invites speculation about why this 
might be so. One possibility is that open space and parcel size are complements in the landowner 
utility function. A second possibility is that these attributes are not utility complements, but that 
the sorting of heterogeneous agents across the landscape effectively generates a complementary 
relationship in the land value function. This distinction may have significant implications for the 
design and implementation of open space policy.  
This paper highlights the importance of understanding the spillover effects of local open-
space conservation policy on land development.  It emphasizes that in many cases the 
relationship between the creation of local open space and development is complex and not 
always intuitive. Development density is a key driver of many ecological processes, and so 
empirical modeling of the effect of open-space spillovers on the spatial dynamics of 
development can provide important information for conservation practitioners.  
  27Figure 1. Discrete-change effects of open-space conservation policies on probability of 
subdivision and expected number of parcels across all observations  
 
1.a. Discrete-change effects of increasing public conservation land by 10 percentage points on 




















































































































































1.c Discrete-change effects of 200 ft. vs. 100 ft. minimum frontage zoning on expected number 




























































Note: z statistics for all discrete-change effects are calculated with the Delta Method (Greene 
2000). 
 
  28Figure 2. Lake Development Paths with Alternative Open-Space Conservation Policies (average 
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  29Table 1. Variables Used in Estimation 
Variable Description  Data  Source  Average  Min  Max 
Parcel-Specific 
Characteristics 
        
Front  Shoreline frontage of the property  
(1000’s of feet) 
GIS Maps  0.75 0.2  13 
PSL 
Percent Soil Limitation: Percent 
of the parcel with soil limitations 
for development 
USDA – Soil 
Surveys 0.56  0  1 
PSNR 
Percent Soil Not Rated: Percent of 
the parcel with no soil rating (e.g. 
bog) 
USDA – Soil 
Surveys 0.24  0  0.67 
Split 
Dummy variable taking a value of 
one if the only subdivision 
possible is a split of the parcel;  
GIS Maps 
0.4 0  1 
Lake-Specific 
Characteristics 
      
AvFront  Average frontage for all properties 
on the lake (1000’s of feet) 
GIS Maps  0.41 0.11 2.4 
Public 
Proportion of the lake’s shoreline 
owned by County, State, or 
Federal government 
GIS Maps 
0.07 0 0.87 
Water Clarity  Secchi depth visibility (feet)  WI DNR  6.23  1.23  20.6 
Lake Size  Surface area of the lake (acres)  GIS Maps  484  3  3555 
Lake Depth  Maximum depth of the lake (feet)  WI DNR  37  3  86 
Distance 
Distance to the nearest town with 
major services - Minoquoa or 
Eagle River (km) 
GIS Maps 
6.47 0.26 171 
Zoning 
100 ft. (Zone=0) or 200 ft. 
(Zone=1) minimum frontage 
zoning 
GIS Maps / 
Townships 0.22  0  1 
  30Table 2. Full-Information Maximum Simulated Likelihood Parameter Estimates 








































Constant  -1.50** 0.18 -0.23 0.27 -1.60** 0.17 0.23 0.25
              
Parcel-Specific Characteristics            
Front    0.42** 0.07 0.92** 0.10 0.45** 0.06 0.68** 0.08
Front ^ 2  -0.49** 0.10 -0.54** 0.12 -0.37** 0.08 -0.46** 0.08
PSL  -0.29** 0.13 -0.29 0.24 -0.35** 0.13 -0.43* 0.22
PSNR  -1.22** 0.21 0.02 0.39 -1.24** 0.21 0.57 0.37
Split  -0.71** 0.09    -0.73**  0.09    
              
Lake-Specific Characteristics            
AvFront  -0.44 0.27 0.11 0.30       
Public  0.36 0.31 -0.26 0.68 0.39 0.32 -0.82 0.75
Water Clarity  0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04** 0.01
LakeSize  1.41E-04* 8.E-05 -7.7E-05 1.E-04 1.68E-04* 9.E-05 1.2E-04 1.E-04
LakeDepth  -3.06E-03 3.E-03 -5.5E-03 4.E-03 -3.2E-03 3.E-03 -0.01** 0.004
Distance  0.14 0.09 0.05 0.13 0.11 0.10 0.23 0.12
Zoning         0.32**  0.15 -0.86** 0.21
              
Interactions              
AvFront * Zoning  0.30 0.19 -0.37 0.28       
Front * AvFront   0.15** 0.08 -0.15 0.11       
Front * AvFront * Zoning  -0.14 0.10 0.16 0.11       
Front * Public  -0.51** 0.21 0.09 0.40 -0.58** 0.25 0.57 0.52
Front * Zoning  0.02 0.09 -0.17* 0.10 -0.20* 0.12 0.06 0.10
                
Time-Specific Dummies              
1974  0.03 0.10 0.46** 0.22 0.002 0.10 0.21 0.15
1978  0.09 0.10 0.37** 0.18 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.16
1982  -0.14 0.11 0.40** 0.21 -0.16 0.11 0.20 0.17
1986  0.23** 0.10 0.24 0.19 0.23** 0.10 0.08 0.15
1990  0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.19 0.04 0.10 -0.13 0.18
                
Random Effects             
1 σ ; st. dev. of  lake effect ( l μ )  0.22** 0.05    0.24**  0.06
  
2 σ ; st.dev. of parcel effect ( n ϖ )  0.53** 0.04    0.47**  0.04
  
ρ ; corr. coef. for  , nt n υ η   0.08* 0.06    0.11*  0.06
  




1 β σ , 
3 β σ ; st. dev. of Zoning         0.55  0.45 0.05 0.15
2 β σ ; st. dev. of Zoning·Front      
1.69 2.29 0.42** 0.08
             
Log Likelihood  -1871.26      -1845.24      
**significantly different from zero at 5% level; *significantly different from zero at 10% level 
Note: standard errors for structural probit coefficients calculated with the Delta Method. 
Note: off-diagonal Choleski factors in model 2 are not presented.  
  31 
References 
 
Ai, C., and E.C. Norton. 2003. “Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models.” Economics 
Letters, 80: 123-129. 
Armsworth, P.R., Dailey, G.C., Kareiva, P., and J.N. Sanchirico. 2006. “Land Market Feedbacks 
can Undermine Biodiversity Conservation.” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 103(14): 5403.5408. 
Anselin, L. 2002. “Under the Hood: Issues in the Specification and Interpretation of Spatial 
Regression Models.” Agricultural Economics, 27: 247-267. 
Bockstael, N.E. 1996. “Modeling Economics and Ecology: The Importance of a Spatial 
Perspective.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78:1168-1180. 
Boyle, K.J., Poor, P.J., and L.O. Taylor. 1999. “Estimating the Demand for Protecting 
Freshwater Lakes from Eutrophication.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
81(5): 1118-1122. 
Brock, W., and S. Durlauf. 2001. “Discrete-Choice with Social Interactions.” Review of 
Economic Studies, 68: 235-260. 
Cameron, A.C., and P.K. Trivedi. 2005. Microeconometrics: Methods and Applications. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Capozza, D., and R. Helsley. 1989. “The Fundamentals of Land Prices and Urban Growth.” 
Journal of Urban Economics, 26:295-306. 
Carrion-Flores, C. and E.G. Irwin. 2004. “Determinants of Residential Land-Use Conversion and 
Sprawl at the Rural-Urban Fringe.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 86(4): 
889-904. 
  32Christensen, D.L, Herwig, B.R., Schindler, D.E., and S.R. Carpenter. 1996. “Impacts of 
Lakeshore Residential Development on Coarse Woody Debris in North Temperate 
Lakes.” Ecological Applications, 6(4): 1143-1149. 
Flader, S.L. (ed.). 1983. The Great Lakes Forest, an Environmental and Social History. 
University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 
Greene, W. 2000. Econometric Analysis. 4
th Edition. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, NY. 
Greene, W. 2006. “A General Approach for Incorporating Selectivity in a Model.” Working 
Paper, Department of Economics, New York University. 
Hrabik T.R, and J.J.Magnuson. 1999. “Simulated Dispersal of Exotic Rainbow Smelt (Osmerus 
mordax) in a Northern Wisconsin Lake District and Implications for Management.” 
Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 56: 35–42. 
Irwin, E. and N.E. Bockstael. 2002. “Interacting Agents, Spatial Externalities and the Evolution 
of Residential Land Use Patterns.” Journal of Economic Geography 2: 331-54. 
Irwin, E.G., and N.E. Bockstael. 2004. “Land Use Externalities, Open Space Preservation, and 
Urban Sprawl.” Regional Science and Urban Economics 34: 705-725.  
Lewis, D.J., Hunt, G.L., and A.J. Plantinga. 2002. “Public Conservation Land and Employment 
Growth in the Northern Forest Region.” Land Economics, 78(2): 245-259. 
Lewis, D.J., and A.J. Plantinga. 2007. “Policies for Habitat Fragmentation: Combining 
Econometrics with GIS-Based Landscape Simulations.” Land Economics, 83(2): 109-
127. 
Lindsay, A.R., Gillum, S.S., and M.W. Meyer. 2002. “Influence of Lakeshore Development on 
Breeding Bird Communities in a Mixed Northern Forest.” Biological Conservation, 107: 
1-11. 
  33Manski, C.F. 2000. “Economic Analysis of Social Interactions.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(3): 115-136. 
McConnell, V., Walls, M., and E. Kopits. 2006. “Zoning, TDRs, and the Density of 
Development.” Journal of Urban Economics, 59: 440-457. 
Mundlak, Y. 1978. “On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross Section Data.” Econometrica, 46: 
69-85. 
Newburn, D.A., and P. Berck. 2006. “Modeling Suburban and Rural-Residential Development 
Beyond the Urban Fringe.” Land Economics, 82(4): 481-499. 
Schindler, D.W. 2006. “Recent Advances in the Understanding and Management of 
Eutrophication.” Limnology and Oceanography, 51(1): 356-363. 
Schindler, D.E., Geib, S.I., and M.R. Williams. 2000. “Patterns of Fish Growth Along a 
Residential Development Gradient in North Temperate Lakes.” Ecosystems, 3(3): 229-
237. 
Schnaiberg, J., Riera, J., Turner, M.G., and P.R. Volss. 2002. “Explaining Human Settlement 
Patterns in a Recreational Lake District: Vilas County, Wisconsin, USA.” Environmental 
Management, 30(1): 24-34. 
Spalatro, F., and B. Provencher. 2001. “An Analysis of Minimum Frontage Zoning to Preserve 
Lakefront Amenities.” Land Economics, 77(4): 469-481. 
Train, K. 2003. Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University Press. 
Turner, M.A. 2005. “Landscape Preferences and Patterns of Residential Development.” Journal 
of Urban Economics, 57(1): 19-54. 
Walsh, R. 2007. “Endogenous Open Space Amenities in a Locational Equilibrium.” Journal of 
Urban Economics, 61: 319-344. 
  34Woodford, J.E., and M.W. Meyer. 2003. “Impact of Lakeshore Development on Green Frog 
Abundance.” Biological Conservation, 110: 277-284. 
Wu, J. 2006. “Environmental Amenities, Urban Sprawl, and Community Characteristics.” 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52(2): 527-547.  
Wu, J. and A.J. Plantinga. 2003. “Open Space Policies and Urban Spatial Structure.” Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 46(2): 288-309. 
Zabel, J.E. 1992. “Estimating Fixed and Random Effects Models with Selectivity.” Economics 
Letters, 40: 269-272.  
 
  35Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Similarly, there is a set of studies that find lower probabilities of parcel-level development in 
areas with higher amounts of adjacent development or higher population densities (Irwin and 
Bockstael 2002; Carrion-Flores and Irwin 2004; Newburn and Berck 2006).  In addition, other 
studies find that higher urban rents increase the probability of land converting from agriculture or 
forestland to residential development (Lewis and Plantinga 2007). 
2 An exception is Newburn and Berck (2006), who model development as the choice of four 
density classes in a multinomial random parameters logit framework. 
3 Our dataset may not be that unusual; McConnell et al. (2006) found that only 8% of all 
subdivisions in an urban-rural fringe region of Maryland developed at the maximum density 
allowed by zoning.  
4 Typically these models assume a fixed cost of land conversion which is not germaine to our 
discussion here. Irwin and Bockstael (2004) discuss the conditions under which the sort of 
simple stopping problem used in the literature is strictly applicable. Although these conditions 
are strong, the basic model remains generally intuitive and compelling.  
5 Including an inverse Mills ratio as an explanatory variable –the usual method to account for 
selection bias in ordinary least squares –is not appropriate in Poisson models (Greene 2006). 
6 Plat maps are provided by Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. 
7 When the plat map is scanned, it is simply a picture with no geographic coordinates. 
8 Lakes that were not included either lacked digitized parcel maps in 2003, or a single individual 
owned the lake. 
9 In our sample, 38 lakes lie in towns where a minimum frontage requirement of 200 feet was in 
place in 1974, 13 lakes lie in towns that switched to a 200-foot minimum sometime between 
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1974 and 1998, and the remaining 89 lakes lie in towns that default to the state minimum of 100 
feet. 
10 The Northern Highland - American Legion State Forest and the Chequamegon - Nicolet 
National Forest account for most of the public shoreline in Vilas County. 
11 The particular zoning standard we used to determine violations was the minimum frontage 
requirement, which is the measure of zoning strictness we use in our econometric analysis. 
12 The endogeneity of neighboring development is discussed as an identification problem by 
Irwin and Bockstael (2002), and also arises in the more general literature on social interactions 
(e.g. Manski 2000; Brock and Durlauf 2001). 
13 Ignoring the presence of spatially-correlated errors in discrete choice models will result in 
inconsistent and inefficient parameter estimates (Anselin 2002). 
14 An alternative approach suggested by Zabel (1992) is to specify the random effect as a 
function of the average of time-varying covariates. 
15 Correlation between random parameters is achieved by estimating covariance parameters of 
the estimated distributions as Choleski factors (Train 2003). 
16 Exceptions are that the expected number of lots is greater on lakes with greater water clarity 
(5% level), and the probability of subdivision is higher on large lakes (10% level). 
17 Significance is determined with a one-tailed test. 
18 This, of course, presumes that open space conservation generates a price premium. Prior 
hedonic results in our study region find significant residential price premiums on lakes with more 
public conservation land and stricter minimum frontage zoning requirements (Spalatro and 
Provencher 2001).   
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0 l
19 For example, Ai and Norton (2003) found that none of the 72 articles published between 1980 
and 1999 in economics journals listed in JSTOR interpreted interaction terms correctly for non-
linear models. 
20 Formally, we calculate the following difference: DC(AvFront=1) – DC(AvFront=0.4), where 
DC(AvFront=1) is the discrete change effect of strict zoning on a lake with 1000 feet average 
frontage and DC(AvFront=0.4) is the discrete change effect of strict zoning on a lake with 400 
feet average frontage. Standard errors of this difference are calculated with the Delta Method. 
21 The subdivision probability is determined from the version of  (13) estimated from model 1, 
with the lake-specific effect set equal to its mean, μ = .  Conceptually this approach to 
simulating the subdivision decision is the same as drawing from the distribution of  the net 
benefit function U  in (8), and recording a subdivision whenever  () ⋅ ( ) 0 U > .  ⋅
22 For more details on the survey see www.aae.wisc.edu/provencher . 
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